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Introduction 
 
1 This paper examines one question in the context of the European Insolvency 
Regulation1 (the “EIR”). This question is this: is it possible to initiate legal 
proceedings against an insolvent debtor in a Member State of the European Union 
(“EU”) that is different from the Member State where the (main) insolvency 
proceedings against the defendant have been opened if the lex concursus (that is, the 
insolvency law of the state where the insolvency proceedings have been opened) 
provides a final moratorium prohibiting or suspending litigation against the debtor 
outside the framework of the insolvency proceedings? In other words, how does the 
principle of vis attractiva concursus2, a principle followed by the domestic 
insolvency laws of several Member States of the EU, affect foreign post-insolvency 
litigation against the debtor? Should the foreign court before which the claimant 
brought an action against the debtor company, refuse to hear the case if the 
applicable insolvency law of the Member State where the insolvency proceedings 
have been opened provides that no such litigation is permitted outside the framework 
of the insolvency proceedings? Or should the foreign court, which has jurisdiction 
to hear the case on the basis of the Brussels I Regulation3 (the “BR”), decide the case 
                                                 
* Zoltán Fabók, Fellow of INSOL International, is a counsel in DLA Piper, Budapest and a PhD candidate 
at Nottingham Law School, Nottingham Trent University. 
1 COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on insolvency proceedings (OJ 2000 
L160/1). Where applicable, REGULATION (EU) 2015/848 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND 
OF THE COUNCIL of 20 May 2015 on insolvency proceedings (recast) (OJ 2015 L141/19) is referred 
as the “recast EIR”. Denmark is not bound by or subject to the application of either the EIR nor the recast 
EIR, see recital (33) EIR and recital (88) recast EIR.  
2 By virtue of the vis attractiva principle the court which opens the insolvency proceedings has within its 
jurisdiction not only the actual insolvency proceedings but also all the actions arising from the insolvency. 
See Miguel VIRGOS and Etienne SCMIT, ‘Report on the Convention of Insolvency Proceedings’ (the 
"Virgós-Schmit Report” or “Report”) at paragraph 77. On the vis attractiva principle in the context of the 
EIR see C. Willemer, Vis attractiva concursus und die Europäische Insolvenzordnung (2006, Mohr 
Siebeck, Tübingen); L. C. Piñeiro, "Vis Attractiva Concursus in the European Union: Its Development 
by the European Court of Justice" (2010) 3 InDret 1. 
3 With the general abbreviation “BR”, unless the opposite appears from the text, I refer alternatively to 
the REGULATION (EU) No 1215/2012 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE 
COUNCIL of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in 
civil and commercial matters (recast) (OJ 2012 L351/1) (the “recast BR”) and to its predecessors, the 
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even if the judgment to be passed will necessarily be of a declaratory nature, given 
that the litigation court can only rule on the existence and amount of the claim but 
not about the enforcement of the claim?  This is because, in such a case, enforcement 
will fall within the scope of the insolvency proceedings and the prevailing party will 
need to lodge his claim with the liquidator in the state of the opening of the 
insolvency proceedings. As will be discussed, the case law supports both 
possibilities. However, as this paper seeks to demonstrate, there is no really good 
answer to this question within the current legal framework. 
 
2 In order to attempt to answer the initial question, it is necessary first to clarify the 
scope of the proceedings where the above question is relevant. Thus, the concept of 
foreign litigation for the purposes of this paper should be delimited from the so-
called “insolvency-related actions” on the one hand and from the pending lawsuits 
on the other. Second, it is submitted that a clear and consistent separation between 
jurisdiction and the applicable law is of utmost importance in order to understand 
the core of the initial question. Third, the interpretation of Article 4(2)(f) of the EIR4 
must be considered. This states that the lex concursus shall determine, among other 
things, the effects of the insolvency proceedings on proceedings brought by 
individual creditors, with the exception of lawsuits pending. Fourth, some of those 
cases will be examined where the courts refused to decide on the merits of the case 
due to ongoing insolvency proceedings in another Member State the effects of which 
(particularly the imposition of a moratorium on new proceedings outside the 
insolvency) were to be governed by the lex concursus. Fifth, by contrast, an English 
law case will be considered in which the court having jurisdiction for the litigation 
on the basis of BR endeavoured to entertain the case. The final section of this paper 
will draw some conclusions and make some suggestions.  
 
Delimitation issues  
 
Insolvency-related Actions are out of Scope 
 
3 The starting point for a discussion of the concept of the insolvency-related actions 
must be the so-called “insolvency exception” in Article 1(2)(b) of the recast BR. The 
BR deals with the jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in 
civil and commercial matters. Accordingly, the insolvency exception states that the 
BR shall not apply to bankruptcy, proceedings relating to the winding-up of 
insolvent companies or other legal persons, judicial arrangements, compositions and 
analogous proceedings. The predecessors of the current BR, the Regulation 44/2001 
and the 1968 Brussels Convention employed the same exception.5 In a case as early 
                                                 
Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (OJ 2001 L12/1) and the 1968 Brussels 
Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters /* 
Consolidated version CF 498Y0126(01) */ (OJ 1972 L299/32). 
4 Article 7(2)(f) recast EIR. 
5 Article 1(2)(b) of the Regulation 44/2001; Article 1(2) of the 1968 Brussels Convention. 
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as 1979, well before the entry into force of the EIR, the Court of Justice of the EU 
(the “Court”) ruled that those actions which derive directly from the insolvency 
proceedings and are closely linked with them are to be considered falling within the 
insolvency exception of the Brussels Convention (thus outside the scope of that 
convention).6 This “Gourdain formula” has been maintained and confirmed several 
times in the past decades.7 
 
4 Apparently inspired by the Gourdain judgment, the European legislator used the 
same formula in the Convention on Insolvency Proceedings which, after three-
decade long struggle, was eventually born in 1995.8 Without the 1995 Convention 
ever entering into force, it was transformed, without any material changes, into the 
EIR with effect from May 2002. Recital (6) EIR suggests that the regulation should 
be confined to provisions governing jurisdiction for opening insolvency proceedings 
and judgments which are delivered directly on the basis of the insolvency 
proceedings and are closely connected with such proceedings. This is somewhat 
surprising, because the recitals were drafted during the process of transforming the 
1995 Convention into the EIR9 thus by that time it must have been clear that the 
regulation would not consist of any (explicit) provisions regarding the international 
jurisdiction over insolvency-related actions. Article 3(1) of the EIR10 only addresses 
the jurisdiction regarding the opening of main insolvency proceedings by providing 
that the courts of the Member State within the territory of which the centre of a 
debtor's main interests is situated shall have jurisdiction to open insolvency 
proceedings. By contrast, Article 25(1)(2) of the EIR11 indeed addresses the question 
of recognition and enforcement of the insolvency-related judgments extending the 
automatic recognition pursuant to Article of the 16 EIR12 to these type of judgments 
and referring the enforcement to the BR while eliminating, however, the grounds for 
refusal provided for by BR thus setting up a simplified recognition and enforcement 
                                                 
6 Gourdain v Nadler (Case 133/78) [1979] ECR 733; [1979] 3 CMLR 180.  
7 SCT Industri AB i likvidation v Alpenblume AB (Case C-111/08) [2009] ECR I-5655; Seagon v Deko 
Marty Belgium NV (Case C-339/07) [2009] ECR I-767; German Graphics Graphische Maschinen GmbH 
v van der Schee (Case C-292/08) [2009] ECR I-8421; F-Tex SIA v Lietuvos-Anglijos UAB ‘Jadecloud-
Vilma’ (Case C-213/10) [2013] Bus LR 232; Nickel & Goeldner Spedition GmbH v ‘Kintra’ UAB (Case 
C-157/13) [2015] QB 96; H, acting as liquidator in the insolvency of GT GmbH v HK (Case C-295/13) 
[2015] OJ C 46/9; Hayward (Deceased), Re [1997] Ch 45; [1996] 3 WLR 674; [1997] 1 All ER 32; [1997] 
BPIR 456; UBS AG v Omni Holding AG (in Liquidation) [2000] 1 WLR 916; [2000] 1 All ER (Comm) 
42; [2000] BCC 593; [2000] 2 BCLC 310; [2000] ILPr 51; Derek Oakley v Ultra Vehicle Design Limited 
(In Liquidation), Behlke Electronic GmbH [2005] EWHC 872 (Ch); [2006] BCC 57; [2005] ILPr 55; 
[2006] BPIR 115; Polymer Vision R&D Ltd v Van Dooren [2011] EWHC 2951 (Comm); [2012] ILPr 14; 
Byers v Yacht Bull Corp [2010] BCC 368 [2010] ILPr 24.  
8 For the genesis of the EIR see P. Omar, European Insolvency Law (2004, Ashgate) at 49-86; I. Fletcher, 
“Historical Overview: The Drafting of the Regulation and its Precursors” Chapter 1 in G. Moss, I. Fletcher 
and S. Isaacs (eds), EU Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings (3rd ed) (2016, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford) at 1-19; M. Balz, “The European Union Convention on Insolvency Proceedings” (1996) 70 Am. 
Bankr. L.J., 489-494. 
9 See Omar, ibid, at 89. 
10 Article 3(1) recast EIR. See, however, Article 6 recast EIR. 
11 Article 32(1)(2) recast EIR. 
12 Article 19 recast EIR. 
   Nottingham Insolvency and Business Law e-Journal 
 
system in the context of the EIR.13 Beyond, it is also clear from Article 4 of the 
EIR14, which is a conflict of laws provision determining the domestic insolvency law 
(lex concursus) that universally applies for the insolvency proceedings, that the 
insolvency-related actions are typically subject to the lex concursus.15  
 
5 The general view is, supported by the Virgós-Schmit Report (the “Report”)16, the 
academic literature17 and the case law18 that the both regulations – BR and EIR – are 
intended to be mutually exclusive. As the Report puts it, to avoid unjustifiable 
loopholes between the two instruments those actions excluded from the Brussels 
Convention (now BR) by virtue of the Gourdain formula were subject to the 
Insolvency Convention (now EIR) and to its rules of jurisdiction. In Nickel & 
Goeldner19 the Court held: 
 
“[…] that regulation [BR] and Regulation No 1346/2000 [EIR] 
must be interpreted in such a way as to avoid any overlap between 
the rules of law that those texts lay down and any legal vacuum. 
Accordingly, actions excluded, under Article 1(2)(b) of Regulation 
No 44/2001, from the application of that regulation in so far as 
they come under 'bankruptcy, proceedings relating to the winding-
                                                 
13 MG Probud Gdynia sp z o.o (Case C-444/07) [2010] ECR I-417, at paragraphs 26-34. 
14 Article 7 recast EIR. 
15 In contrast, Bariatti is of the view that from the text of the EIR is clear that the law applicable to the act 
detrimental to creditors is not the lex concursus.  See S. Bariatti, "Filling in the Gaps of EC Conflicts of 
Laws Instruments: The Case of Jurisdiction over Actions Related to Insolvency Proceedings" in G. 
Venturini and S. Bariatti (eds), Liber Fausto Pocar (Giuffre Editore 2009), at 36. 
16 At paragraph 77. 
17 M. Virgós and F. Garcimartín: The European Insolvency Regulation: Law and Practice (2004, Kluwer 
Law International, The Hague) at 56-57; G. McCormack, "Reconciling European Conflicts and 
Insolvency Law" (2014) 15 E.B.O.R. 309, at 334. By contrast, T. Linna remarks that a certain gap between 
the two instruments necessarily exists: “The problem arises as the EIR (or the Brussels I Regulation) does 
not enact that all the excluded [italics in original] proceedings fall within the scope of the EIR. Instead, 
Article 1(1) EIR provides independent criteria [italics in original] for insolvency proceedings. The scope 
of the EIR is formed in accordance with these criteria. In other words, the gap is there because the scope 
of the EIR is not a mirror image of the scope of the Brussels I Regulation. Recital 7 in the EIR reform 
proposal [now the recast EIR] refers to the list of exclusions in Article 1(2)(b) of the Brussels I Regulation 
and notes that these proceedings should be covered by the present EIR and that the interpretation of the 
EIR should as much as possible avoid regulatory loop- holes between the two instruments. Even if this 
recital text supports a flexible interpretation of the conditions pertaining to the scope of the EIR, the basic 
problem still remains.” See Tuula Linna, "Actio Pauliana - »Actio Europensis«? Some Cross-Border 
Insolvency Issues" (2014) 10(1) Journal of Private International Law 69, at 74. Regarding the gap see 
also German Graphics Graphische Maschinen GmbH v van der Schee, above note 7. As to the boundaries 
between the two institutions see P. J. Omar, "The Insolvency Exception in the Brussels Convention and 
the Definition of »Analogous Proceedings«" (2011) 22(5) I.C.C.L.R., 172. 
18 See Polymer Vision R&D Ltd v Van Dooren, above note 7, at paragraphs 46-47; Derek Oakley v Ultra 
Vehicle Design Limited (In Liquidation), Behlke Electronic GmbH, above note 7, at paragraph 35; 
similarly: REPORT ON THE CONVENTION on the Association of the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland 
and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Convention on jurisdiction and the 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters and to the Protocol on its interpretation by the 
Court of Justice (Schlosser Report) OJ 1979 C59/90.  
19 See Nickel & Goeldner Spedition GmbH v ‘Kintra’ UAB, above note 7, at paragraph 21. 
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up of insolvent companies or other legal persons, judicial 
arrangements, compositions and analogous proceedings' fall 
within the scope of Regulation No 1346/2000.” 
 
6 The case law regarding the insolvency-related proceedings is extensive.20 In 
general terms, it can be said that in order to qualify an action as one deriving directly 
from insolvency proceedings and closely connected with them (as insolvency-
related), the Court considers that that action is based on the insolvency law 
provisions of the applicable law derogating from the general rules of civil law.21 
These actions cannot exist outside the context of the insolvency proceedings. The 
main types of the insolvency-related actions are these: actions to set aside acts 
detrimental to the general body of creditors (avoidance actions),22 actions on the 
personal liability of directors (including de facto directors) based upon insolvency 
law,23 lawsuits relating to the admission or the ranking of a claim,24 disputes between 
the liquidator and the debtor on whether an asset belongs to the bankrupt's estate and 
disputes related to the exercise of the powers of the liquidator, including the related 
liability issues.25  
 
7 What is particularly important from the point of view of this paper is the Seagon26 
judgment. In this decision the Court ruled that the courts of the Member State within 
the territory of which insolvency proceedings had been opened had jurisdiction to 
decide an action to set a transaction aside by virtue of insolvency that was brought 
against a person whose registered office was in another Member State. Although the 
ruling concerns the avoidance actions only, it is submitted27 that the principle 
underlying the ruling applies to other types of insolvency-related actions, as well. 
By this decision the Court declared that, in the context of the EIR, the vis attractiva 
principle applies regarding insolvency-related proceedings: the courts of the state 
where insolvency proceedings have been opened also have international jurisdiction 
to hear insolvency-related cases. This view has expressly been adopted by the recast 
EIR.28  
 
                                                 
20 Among others, see above notes 6-7.   
21 See Gourdain, above note 6, at paragraphs 4-6; Virgós-Schmit Report, at paragraph 196; M. Virgós 
and F. Garcimartín, above note 17, at 61-62. While the BR should be broad in its scope, the scope of 
application of the EIR should not be broadly interpreted; see German Graphics, above note 7, at 
paragraphs 23 and 25. 
22 See e.g. Seagon, above note 7; Schmid v Hertel (Case C-328/12) [2014] 1 WLR 633. 
23 See Gourdain, above note 6; H, acting as liquidator in the insolvency of G.T. GmbH v H.K., above note 
7; Simona Kornhaas v Thomas Dithmar as liquidator of the assets of Kornhaas Montage und 
Dienstleistung Ltd (C-594/14) [2015] ECLI:EU:C:2015:806. 
24 Fondazione Enasarco v Lehman Brothers Finance SA [2014] EWHC 34 (Ch); [2014] 2 BCLC 662. 
25 See Polymer Vision R&D Ltd v Van Dooren, above note 7. 
26 Above note 7. On the decision see P. Mankowski and C. Willemer, “Die internationale Zuständigkeit 
für Insolvenzanfechtungsklagen” (2009)10 Recht der internationalen Wirtschaft 669. 
27 See F-Tex SIA v Lietuvos-Anglijos UAB ‘Jadecloud-Vilma’, above note 7, at paragraph 27.  
28 Article 6 recast EIR. 
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8 To sum up: in the case of insolvency-related actions the jurisdiction as determined 
by Article 3(1) of the EIR includes the jurisdiction to hear the insolvency-related 
cases, too. Article 6 of the recast EIR makes this completely clear by providing that 
the courts of the Member State within the territory of which insolvency proceedings 
have been opened in accordance with Article 3 of the EIR shall have jurisdiction for 
any action which derives directly from the insolvency proceedings and is closely 
linked with them, such as avoidance actions. Beyond, given that an action, in order 
to be qualified as insolvency-related, must derive directly from the insolvency 
proceedings and be closely linked with them, there is little doubt that the same 
domestic substantive insolvency law will govern both the insolvency proceedings 
and the connected insolvency-related action. Since the forum applies its own 
substantive insolvency law as lex concursus when ruling on the insolvency-related 
cases there is, by definition, no room for any collision between the jurisdiction and 
the applicable law. For this reason, insolvency-related actions are outside the scope 
of this paper.  
 
Pending Lawsuits are out of Scope 
 
9 Article 4(2)(f) of the EIR29 states that, in the context of EIR, the lex concursus 
determines the effects of the insolvency proceedings on proceedings brought by 
individual creditors, with the exception of lawsuits pending. This provision is to be 
read in conjunction with Article 15 of the EIR30 providing that the effects of 
insolvency proceedings on a pending lawsuit shall be governed solely be the law of 
the Member State in which that lawsuit is pending. Article 15 of the EIR is one of 
the exceptions to the generally applicable lex concursus provided by the EIR:31 
although the opening of insolvency proceedings does affect lawsuits which have 
been initiated prior to the opening of the insolvency proceedings in another Member 
State, these effects are not direct; in other words, the lex concursus does not directly 
apply in the state where the lawsuit is pending. Instead, the effect of the lex 
concursus is indirect: the law of the state where the lawsuit is pending (lex fori 
processus) will determine how the insolvency proceedings opened in another 
Member State affects the ongoing litigation.32 Articles 7(2)(f) and 18 of the recast 
EIR follow the same path thus the recast EIR has not brought any relevant changes.33 
 
                                                 
29 Article 7(2)(f) recast EIR 
30 Article 18 recast EIR 
31 See Articles 5-15 EIR; Articles 8-18 recast EIR. 
32 See three decisions of the Austrian Supreme Court 17 March 2005, 8 Ob 131/04d; 24 January 2006, 10 
Ob 80/05w; 23 February 2006, 9 Ob 135/04z. The decisions were referred to in Syska v Vivendi Universal 
SA [2009] EWCA Civ 677; [2009] 2 All ER (Comm) 891; [2009] Bus LR 1494; [2010] BCC 348; [2010] 
1 BCLC 467; [2009] 2 CLC 10; [2009] BPIR 1304; [2009] 28 EG 84 (CS); (2009) 159 NLJ 1033, at 
paragraph 42; and in G. Moss and T. Smith, “Commentary on Regulation 1346/2000 and Recast 
Regulation 2015/848 on Insolvency Proceedings”, Chapter 8 in G. Moss, I. Fletcher and S. Isaacs (eds), 
EU Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings (3rd edition) (2016, Oxford University Press, Oxford), at 363. 
33 There is one important change, though. Namely, Article 18 recast EIR expressly includes arbitration 
proceedings apparently adopting the English decision in Syska v Vivendi, ibid. 
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10 Given that the lex concursus does not apply concerning the lawsuits pending, any 
collision is excluded between the lex concursus on the one hand and the provisions 
on the basis of which the jurisdiction of the court hearing the lawsuit pending is 
based on the other hand. In other words: whatever the lex concursus says about the 
moratorium regarding the lawsuits pending in other Member States is irrelevant. 
Namely, the consequences of the insolvency shall be drawn solely on the basis of 
the lex fori processus. For this reason, also the lawsuits pending are outside the scope 
of this paper.34  
 
Claims for Performance are out of Scope 
 
11 The main characteristic of insolvency proceedings is that they are collective in 
nature. The question of distribution of the proceeds or particularly the proceeds of  
any enforcement actions vis-à-vis the estate belongs to the very core of the lex 
concursus.35 In the system of the EIR the enforcement pertains to the competence of 
the state where the enforcement is sought.36 Thus, even if a foreign litigation forum 
ordered the debtor subject to insolvency proceedings in another Member State to 
perform a payment, such judgment could only be “enforced” if the state where the 
enforcement is sought declared such judgment enforceable (exequatur or acceptance 
by the insolvency practitioner).37  
 
12 In the context of insolvency, commercial lawsuits tend to be of a declaratory 
nature.  Their effect is limited to the determination of the existence, legal basis, 
validity, content or amount of a claim.  Even if a judgment formally orders the 
insolvent defendant to perform, the judgment should be regarded as a declaratory 
one because the only way to enforce the judgment is, typically, to lodge the claim 
confirmed by the judgment with the liquidator in compliance with the lex concursus. 
The actual “execution” of the commercial judgment takes place in the framework of 
the insolvency proceedings: the judgment creditor will have a share from the 
distribution of the debtor’s assets if and as far as the lex concursus allows.   
 
Post-opening Commercial Proceedings against the Insolvent Debtor38 
 
                                                 
34 However, if the applicable lex processus provides for a moratorium and requires the claimant to submit 
his claim with the insolvency forum instead of the litigation forum then the situation is similar to the one 
analysed in this paper.   
35 Subject to the exceptions in Articles 5-15 EIR; Articles 8-18 recast EIR. 
36 See Article 25 EIR; Article 32 recast EIR. 
37 A lawsuit is of declaratory nature if its effect is merely limited to the determination of the existence, 
legal basis, validity, content or amount of a claim. Even if a judgment formally ordered the insolvent 
defendant to perform, the judgment should be regarded as a declaratory one because the only way to 
enforce the judgment would be to lodge the claim with the liquidator – in compliance with the lex 
concursus. 
38 Actions initiated by the insolvent debtor (typically represented by the liquidator), even those which are 
not insolvency-related, i.e. based on the general commercial law, are outside the scope of this paper, too, 
because a moratorium provided by a lex concursus will most probably not prevent the debtor from 
bringing actions vis-à-vis third parties.   
   Nottingham Insolvency and Business Law e-Journal 
 
13 The category of proceedings where the interplay between jurisdiction and the 
applicable law must be examined, is those “other”39 civil and commercial 
proceedings which have been initiated after the opening of the insolvency 
proceedings (that is where they are not pending lawsuits) and do not fall within the 
category of the insolvency-related actions. These are proceedings the connection of 
which to the insolvency proceeding is not close enough to qualify them as 
insolvency-related; according to the Report,40 these will include actions on the 
existence or the validity under general law of a claim or relating to its amount, 
actions to recover another's property the holder of which is the debtor, and, in 
general, actions that the debtor could have undertaken even without the opening of 
insolvency proceedings.41 As a consequence, neither the jurisdiction rules of the 
EIR42 nor the simplified recognition and enforcement regime as provided by Article 
25(1) of the EIR43 are applicable regarding these proceedings. Instead, provided that 
the BR is applicable,44 the latter will determine which courts have jurisdiction to hear 
these cases and the mechanism as to how these judgments may be recognised and 
enforced in other Member States.  
 
The Coexistence of the Rules on Jurisdiction and those on the Applicable Law 
 
14 As discussed, the BR determines the international jurisdiction regarding the post-
opening commercial claims against the debtor over which insolvency proceedings 
have been opened in another Member State. The jurisdiction pursuant to the BR may 
be conferred on courts of Member States where the insolvency proceedings have 
been opened. Article 4 of the recast BR states, as a general rule on jurisdiction in the 
context of the BR, that persons domiciled45 in a Member State shall be sued in the 
courts of that Member State. In most cases, this general jurisdictional rule will point 
to the place of the COMI of the debtor-defendant,46 that is, principally to the state 
where the (main) insolvency proceedings have been opened.47 In such a case, there 
is no potential for conflict between the lex concursus and the provisions on the 
jurisdiction. However, the BR acknowledges several other grounds of jurisdiction. 
Such alternative grounds of jurisdiction may be more likely to allocate the 
jurisdiction to the courts of a Member State which differs from the place where the 
COMI of the defendant is located. For instance, the place of the performance of the 
                                                 
39 See the wording of Article 25(2) EIR, Article 32(2) recast EIR. 
40 Virgós-Schmit Report, at paragraph 196. 
41 Decisions where the courts held that the actions do not fall within the insolvency exception of the BR 
are e.g. Nickel & Goeldner Spedition GmbH v ‘Kintra’ UAB, above note 7; F-Tex SIA v Lietuvos-Anglijos 
UAB ‘Jadecloud-Vilma’, above note 7; German Graphics Graphische Maschinen GmbH v van der Schee, 
above note 7; Hayward (Deceased), Re, above note 7; Byers v Yacht Bull Corp, above note 7. 
42 Article 3(1) EIR (implied), Article 6 recast EIR.  
43 Article 32(1) recast EIR. 
44 See the exclusions in Article 1(2) recast BR. For the interpretation of the phrase “provided that that 
regulation [the BR] is applicable” in Article 25(2) EIR and 32(2) recast EIR see German Graphics 
Graphische Maschinen GmbH v van der Schee, above note 7, at paragraphs 14-20. 
45 Articles 62-63 recast BR. 
46 See Article 3(1) EIR, Article 3(1) recast EIR. 
47 See Virgós-Schmit Report, at paragraphs 75 and 206. 
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obligation determines the jurisdiction in contractual matters48 and the place where 
the harmful event occurred or may occur determines the jurisdiction in matters 
relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict.49 Most importantly, the parties themselves may 
also choose to submit to the jurisdiction of a certain court (prorogation of 
jurisdiction).50  
 
15 As we have seen regarding the insolvency-related proceedings, the substantive 
law governing those proceedings is necessarily the lex concursus: in order to be 
qualified as insolvency-related, the action must be based on the applicable 
insolvency law. By contrast, regarding the post-opening commercial (that is, non 
insolvency-related) claims against the debtor, the situation is slightly different. The 
rights and obligations of the parties are created and defined by the ordinary rules of 
civil, commercial, labour and other law.51 The mere fact that one of the parties goes 
insolvent does not change the law governing the contract; for example, a dispute 
arising under a contract subject to English law should not be decided pursuant to 
French law just because the obligor is subject to insolvency proceedings in France. 
Basically, the validity of the contract, the legal basis and the amount or subject-
matter of the claim remains to be judged on the basis of the law originally applied to 
the contract.52 In the context of the EU, the two most important legal instruments are 
the Rome I Regulation53 determining the applicable law in contractual relations and 
the Rome II Regulation54 dealing with the law applicable to non-contractual 
obligations. A basic feature of both regulations is that the parties enjoy a freedom of 
choice as to the applicable law55 (although the parties typically make use of this 
freedom of choice in the case of international commercial transactions falling within 
the scope of the Rome I Regulation).  
 
16 The fact that the insolvency of the debtor does not change the law governing the 
contract does not mean that the insolvency proceeding would not affect the litigation 
at all. Pursuant to Article 4 of the EIR,56 the law applicable to insolvency proceedings 
and their effects shall be that of the Member State within the territory of which such 
proceedings are opened. In other words, the insolvency law of the Member State 
where the main insolvency proceedings have been opened (the lex concursus) 
universally applies throughout the Member States of the EU. Therefore, in the event 
                                                 
48 Article 7(1) BR. 
49 Article 7(2) BR. 
50 Article 25 BR. 
51 M. Virgós and F. Garcimartín, above note 17, at 69.  
52 Unless, of course, if the parties agree to subject the contract to a law other than that which previously 
governed it. See Article 3(2) of the Rome I Regulation. See REGULATION (EC) NO 593/2008 OF THE 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to 
contractual obligations (Rome I) (OJ 2008 L 177/6). 
53 Ibid. 
54 REGULATION (EC) No 864/2007 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL 
of 11 July 2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II) (OJ 2007 L 199/40). 
55 Article 3 of the Rome I Regulation; Article 14 of the Rome II Regulation. In both instruments, several 
exceptions to the freedom of choice of law apply. 
56 Article 7 recast EIR. 
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of insolvency, the parties need to face with possibility that a foreign insolvency law 
will impact on their rights and obligations.57 The universal application of the lex 
concursus may only be limited by the exceptions to Article 4 of the EIR as provided 
by Articles 5-15 of the EIR,58 and by opening territorial proceeding(s) in other 
Member State(s).59 The universal application of the lex concursus follows from both 
the wording of Article 4 of the EIR and Articles 16-17(1) of the EIR60 expressly 
widening the effects of the opening of the insolvency proceedings to all Member 
States. The application of Article 4 of the EIR, and consequently that of the lex 
concursus is independent from the jurisdiction. Not only the courts opening and 
conducting the insolvency proceedings need to apply the lex concursus. On the 
contrary, whichever court is competent, the law applied (the lex concursus) will be 
the same; it is aimed at all courts in the EU.61  
 
17 Consequently, the court before which a post-opening claim against the debtor 
subject to foreign main insolvency proceeding has been brought needs to take into 
consideration both the general commercial law governing the case (the lex causae) 
and the insolvency law of the opening state (the lex concursus). While the general 
law, at least in theory, continues to apply to the questions like the validity, the legal 
and factual basis and the amount or subject of the claim, insolvency law determines 
the “insolvency effects”,62 for example as to which assets form part of the estate, 
what effect the opening has on the current contracts of the debtor and how the 
opening influences the individual proceedings brought by creditors. The scope of the 
“insolvency effects” is determined by the particular lex concursus. However, the 
non-exhaustive list provided by Article 4(2) of the EIR63 gives a broad idea of the 
questions generally belonging to the realm of the lex concursus.   
 
18 The example of the German Graphics judgment64 of the Court, which has been 
criticised by a number of scholars,65 demonstrates convincingly that the question of 
                                                 
57 As to the “hidden bankruptcy clause” and the “risks of internationality” arguments see M. Virgós, ”The 
1995 European Community Convention on Insolvency Proceedings: an Insider’s View” (1998) 25 Forum 
Internationale 1, at 7-8.  
58 Articles 8-18 recast EIR. 
59 In the latter case, the law of the state where the territorial (Article 3(2) EIR, Article 3(2) recast EIR) 
proceedings have been opened will apply. However, the territorial scope of this “lex concursus 
territorialis” is limited to the Member State where the territorial proceedings have been opened; see 
Article 3(2) EIR, Article 3(2) recast EIR. 
60 Articles 19-20(1) recast EIR. 
61 M. Virgós and F. Garcimartín, above note 17, at 59. See Probud, above note 13. 
62 See M. Virgós and F. Garcimartín ibid, at 73. “[T]he lex fori concursus displaces, in so far as insolvency 
policy requires, the law governing the affected act or right itself.” 
63 Article 7(2) recast EIR. 
64 German Graphics Graphische Maschinen GmbH v van der Schee, above note 7. 
65 See G. McCormack, above note 17, at 329-330; Z. Crespi Reghizzi, “Reservation of title in insolvency 
proceedings: Some remarks in light of the German Graphics judgment of the ECJ” in A. Bonomi and R. 
Gian Paolo (eds), Yearbook of Private International Law 2010 Vol. XII. (2011, De Gruyter). Furthermore, 
regarding the German Graphics case see M. Brinkmann, “Der Aussonderungsstreit im internationalen 
Insolvenzrecht – Zur Abgrenzung zwischen EuGVVO und EuInsVO” (2010) 30(4) Praxis des 
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the jurisdiction and that of the lex concursus should be treated separately. The facts 
in a nutshell: German Graphics Graphische Maschinen GmbH, a German company, 
sold machines to a Dutch company called Holland Binding BV, under a contract 
which included a reservation of title clause. The Dutch company went into 
involuntary liquidation in the Netherlands. Subsequently, the German court granted 
the application made by German Graphics for the adoption of protective measures 
with regard to a certain number of machines situated at the premises of Holland 
Binding in the Netherlands. That application was based on the reservation of title 
clause. The question arose in the proceedings before the Dutch courts whether or not 
the German order should be recognised and enforced in the Netherlands. After 
diverging rulings passed by the lower courts, the Dutch Supreme Court requested a 
preliminary ruling from the Court. The question, slightly reshaped by the Court, 
asked whether as a result of the opening of insolvency proceedings against a 
purchaser, where the asset covered by the reservation of title is situated in the 
Member State of the opening of those proceedings, an action brought by the seller 
against that purchaser based on the reservation of title clause is excluded from the 
scope of application of the BR.  
 
19 First, the Court, applying the Gourdain test, examined whether or not the German 
action should be qualified as insolvency related.66 The Court concluded that the link 
between the German action and the Dutch insolvency proceedings was neither 
sufficiently direct nor sufficiently close to exclude the application of BR. German 
Graphics requested the recovery of assets owned by it and the only question before 
the court related to the ownership of certain machines situated on the premises of 
Holland Binding in the Netherlands. The answer to that question of law was 
independent of the opening of insolvency proceedings. The action concerning the 
reservation of title clause constituted an independent claim, as it was not based on 
the law of the insolvency proceedings and required neither the opening of such 
proceedings nor the involvement of a liquidator. Consequently, the Court held that 
a claim such as that brought by German Graphics before the German court does not 
fall outside the scope of application of BR.  
 
20 Second, the Court stated that Article 7(1) of the EIR67 did not influence the 
classification of actions having a link with insolvency proceedings. Article 7(1) of 
the EIR merely states that the opening of insolvency proceedings against the 
purchaser of an asset shall not affect the seller's rights based on a reservation of title 
where at the time of the opening of proceedings the asset is situated within the 
territory of a Member State other than the State of opening of proceedings. In other 
words, that provision only constitutes a substantive rule intended to protect the seller 
with respect to assets which are situated outside the Member State opening 
insolvency proceedings. In the German Graphics case, Article 7(1) of the EIR was 
                                                 
Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts 324; Bob Wessels, "On the Edges of the Insolvency 
Regulation" (2010) 23(2) Insolvency Intelligence 22. 
66 German Graphics Graphische Maschinen GmbH v van der Schee, above note 7, at paragraphs 21-34. 
67 Article 10(1) recast EIR. 
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inapplicable anyway, since German Graphics' assets were situated, at the time of the 
opening of insolvency proceedings, in the Netherlands, that is to say, in the Member 
State of the opening of those proceedings.68 
 
21 Third, the Court ruled out any connection between Article 4(2)(b) of the EIR69 
and the question of jurisdiction. Article 4(2)(b) of the EIR provides that the lex 
concursus shall determine the assets which form part of the estate. The question to 
be answered was whether Dutch law, which determines the status of the asset sold 
to the debtor under retention of title, should somehow influence the jurisdiction of 
the German court to hear the claim brought by the seller of the asset. In other words, 
can the German court be deprived of the jurisdiction rooted in the BR because the 
subject of the litigation is potentially part of the estate in the Netherlands? The Court 
held (as regards the possible effect of Article 4(2)(b) of the EIR on the classification 
of the lawsuit) that that provision only constituted a rule intended to prevent conflicts 
of law by providing that the lex concursus was to apply in order to determine first, 
the assets which form part of the estate and second, the treatment of assets acquired 
by or devolving on the debtor after the opening of the insolvency proceedings. That 
provision had no effect on the scope of the application of the BR.70  
 
22 To sum up, the Court stated, on the basis of the Gourdain formula, that an action 
based on a reservation of title clause vis-à-vis a debtor over which insolvency 
proceedings have been opened in another Member State should not be qualified as 
insolvency-related. Consequently, the limited vis attractiva rule as established in 
Seagon71 does not come into play: instead, the BR continues to determine the 
international jurisdiction. However, the application of the BR merely means that the 
German court had international jurisdiction to entertain the case – and nothing more. 
The Court did not say in German Graphics that the lex concursus (here the laws of 
the Netherlands) would not be applicable for the insolvency aspects of the case. This 
was simply outside the scope of the judgment. Actually, there is little doubt that, 
following Article 4(2)(b) of the EIR72, the German court was (or should have been) 
obliged to apply the lex concursus when deciding whether or not the German 
claimant was entitled to reclaim the asset sold under retention of title to the purchaser 
in the Netherlands.  
 
23 Two conclusions of the German Graphics judgments should be highlighted. First, 
the jurisdictional rules of the EIR have not been widened. The limited vis attractiva 
principle underlying the EIR, as suggested by the Report73 and confirmed by Seagon 
                                                 
68 German Graphics Graphische Maschinen GmbH v van der Schee, above note 7, at paragraphs 35-36. 
69 Article 7(2)(b) recast EIR. 
70 German Graphics Graphische Maschinen GmbH v van der Schee, above note 7, at paragraph 37. 
71 Seagon, above note 7.  
72 Article 7(2)(b) recast EIR. 
73 Actually, the Report is controversial at this point. On the one hand, it stated that the 1995 Insolvency 
Convention adopted neither the precept not the philosophy of Article 15 of the 1982 Community Draft 
Convention inspired by the vis attractiva theory. That provision conferred on the courts of the state of the 
opening of insolvency proceedings jurisdiction over a list of actions resulting from the insolvency. On the 
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remains unchanged: no commercial (i.e. non-insolvency) proceedings other than the 
insolvency-related proceedings as defined by the Gourdain formula will fall within 
the scope of the EIR. Second, the judgment confirmed that Article 4(2)(b) of the 
EIR74 is only a conflicts of laws provision having no effect on the determination of 
the jurisdiction in the context of the BR.75  
 
The Interpretation of Article 4(2)(f) of the EIR76 
 
24 Nevertheless, the relation between the jurisdiction and the law applicable under 
Article 4 of the EIR77 is far from resolved. As McCormack notes,78 German 
Graphics makes no reference to Article 4(2)(f) of the EIR. Indeed, that provision 
may not be disregarded when considering the effects of the lex concursus on the 
jurisdiction of courts entertaining commercial (that is, non-insolvency based) claims 
against the debtor. Article 4(2)(f) of the EIR provides that the lex concursus shall 
determine, among others, the effects of the insolvency proceedings on proceedings 
brought by individual creditors, with the exception of pending lawsuits. The last 
phrase apparently refers to Article 15 of the EIR79 providing an exception to the 
universally applicable lex concursus stating that the effects of insolvency on a 
pending lawsuit shall be governed solely be the law of the Member State where the 
lawsuit is pending.   
 
25 As discussed, the question of international jurisdiction is a separate one from the 
question of applicable law.80 The lex concursus has no repercussion on the rules on 
jurisdiction. This has been held by the Court in Seagon regarding the insolvency 
related actions and in German Graphics regarding the non-insolvency related 
disputes. However, the problem is not that simple. All of the national laws of the 
Member States are believed to provide for an interruption or suspension of 
proceedings or at least executions or seizures of property by means of a stay of steps 
by individual creditors against the debtor or his assets upon insolvency.81 If the 
                                                 
other hand, the Report asserted that those actions excluded from the Brussels Convention (the insolvency 
exception) were subject to the 1995 Insolvency Convention. In effect, the scope of the category of the 
insolvency-related actions as determined by the case law applying the Gourdain formula is quite similar 
to the list provided by Article 15 of the 1982 Community Draft Convention. See Virgós-Schmit Report, 
at paragraph 77. 
74 Article 7(2)(b) recast EIR. 
75 The idea that Article 4 does not concern the question of international jurisdiction found support also 
before German Graphics: See M. Virgós and F. Garcimartín, above note 17, at 57 and 59.; C. Willemer, 
above note 2, at 73. 
76 Article 7(2)(f) recast EIR. 
77 Article 7 recast EIR. 
78 G. McCormack, above note 17, at 329. 
79 Article 18 recast EIR. 
80 Contra see S. Bariatti, above note 15, at 32-34; Z. Crespi Reghizzi, above note 65, at 595-598; A. 
Leandro, "Effet Utile of the Regulation No. 1346 and Vis Attractiva Concursus. Some Remarks on 
the Deko Marty Judgment" in Andrea Bonomi and Paul Volken (eds), Yearbook of Private International 
Law: Volume XI (2009) (Sellier 2010), at 476-480. 
81 G. Moss and T. Smith, above note 32, at 341-342, 360. 
   Nottingham Insolvency and Business Law e-Journal 
 
moratorium provided by the lex concursus is final,82 that is, if the lex concursus 
deprives the court having jurisdiction to entertain the commercial claim from 
actually hearing the case so that the only choice for the creditor to assert his 
commercial claim is to bring the claim before the insolvency court (or other courts 
of the state opening the insolvency proceedings), this in effect amounts to a (de facto) 
vis attractiva rule. Further, the scope of this de facto vis attractiva rule would be 
rather broad because it would consist of not only the insolvency-related actions as 
determined by the Gourdain formula but, what is more important in this context, also 
the post-opening commercial lawsuits against the insolvent debtor. Thus, the 
question is whether the moratorium on new lawsuits against the insolvent debtor as 
provided by the domestic insolvency law of several Member States enjoys a 
universal (EU-wide) application through Article 4(2)(f) of the EIR.83  
 
26 It is remarkable that the Report, explaining Article 4(2)(f) of the EIR,84 seems to 
restrict the scope of Article 4(2)(f) suggesting that that provision determines  
 
“the effects of the insolvency proceedings on executions 
[emphasis added] brought by individual creditors, their suspension 
or prohibition after the opening of collective insolvency 
proceedings”.85  
 
Thus, the Report appears to say that the rather general expression of “proceedings 
brought by individual creditors” covers individual enforcement actions only.86 The 
explanation of Article 15 of the EIR87 does not clear the fog, either. The Report states 
that  
“[t]he Convention distinguishes between the effects of insolvency 
on individual enforcement proceedings and those on lawsuits 
pending. 
 
The effects on individual enforcement actions [emphasis added] 
are governed by the law of the State of the opening (see Article 
4(2)(f)) so that the collective insolvency proceedings may stay or 
prevent any individual enforcement action [emphasis added] 
brought by creditors against the debtor's assets. 
 
                                                 
82 By contrast, as Westbrook puts it, a temporary stay is a matter of case management. See J. L. Westbrook, 
"International Arbitration and Multinational Insolvency" (2010-2011) 29 Penn St. Int’l L. Rev. 635, at 
645. 
83 Article 7(2)(f) recast EIR. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Virgós-Schmit Report, at paragraph 91. This has straightforwardly been confirmed by the Court in 
Probud, above note 13. 
86 Paragraph 190 of the Report does not leave any doubt that the authors use both the expressions 
„execution” and enforcement in the same sense.  
87 Article 18 recast EIR. 
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Effects of the insolvency proceedings on other legal proceedings 
concerning the assets or rights of the estate are governed (ex 
Article 15) by the law of the Contracting State where these 
proceedings are under way.” 88 
 
27. Thus, on the one hand, the Report asserts that Article 4(2)(f) of the EIR89 deals 
with individual enforcement actions; the lex concursus determines whether or not 
individual enforcement actions against the debtor may be brought. On the other hand, 
the Report makes it clear that the “other legal proceedings underway” (pending 
lawsuits) are governed by the lex fori processes so that the implications of the 
insolvency proceedings are to be determined by that law.90 However, the Report 
conspicuously avoids answering the question how, if at all, the lex concursus affects 
the post-insolvency declaratory (non-enforcement) actions against the debtor, given 
that where the commercial court simply passes a ruling on the validity, legal basis 
or the amount of the claim this will be a declaratory judgment and will not fall within 
the scope of an “enforcement action”. Whether or not the moratorium provided by 
the lex concursus inhibits the commencement of such declaratory actions against the 
insolvency debtor is left unanswered by the Report.91 
 
28. The textbook written by Virgós and Garcimartín92, which is often cited by courts 
and in the opinions of advocate generals,93 elaborates on this question. First, 
regarding the vis attractiva principle, the authors ask the question: 
 
“Take the example of a claim, the existence or amount of which is 
disputed between the parties: a creditor files his claim in 
insolvency proceedings opened in State 1, where the claim is 
contested by the liquidator on the basis of general contract law 
[…]; the contract contained a clause submitting any dispute to the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of State 2. Does the opening of 
insolvency proceedings in State 1 prevent the creditor from having 
                                                 
88 Virgós-Schmit Report, at paragraph 142. 
89 Article 7(2)(f) recast EIR. 
90 See Syska v Vivendi, above note 32; Mocover Beheer BV and anonymous natural person [claimant 2] 
v Clemar NV, and others: Rechtbank Rotterdam 1 May 2013, ECLI:NL:RBROT:2013:CA3395; OLG 
Celle v 27112012 - 2 U 147/12. 
91 Balz concisely states that the stay is governed by the lex concursus. See M. Balz, above note 8, at 507-
8. 
92 M. Virgós and F. Garcimartín, above note 17. 
93 See Syska v Vivendi, above note 32, at paragraph 22; See the judgment of the court of first instance in 
Syska v Vivendi:  Syska v Vivendi Universal SA [2009] EWCA Civ 677; [2009] 2 All E.R. (Comm) 891; 
[2009] Bus. L.R. 1494; [2010] B.C.C. 348; [2010] 1 B.C.L.C. 467; [2009] 2 C.L.C. 10; [2009] B.P.I.R. 
1304; [2009] 28 E.G. 84 (C.S.); (2009) 159 N.L.J. 1033, at 30-35, 51, 58, 61, 83, 90;  Seagon v Deko 
Marty Belgium NV (Case C-339/07) [2009] ECR I-767, Opinion of GA Colomer, at notes 37, 38, 39 55; 
Lutz v Bauerle (Case C-557/13) [2015] ECLI:EU:C:2014:2404, Opinion of GA SZPUNAR, at note 16 
and several others; Re Eurofood IFSC Ltd (Case C-341/04) [2005] BCC 1021, Opinion of GA Jacobs, at 
note 4 and others;  Rodenstock GmbH, Re [2011] EWHC 1104 (Ch); [2011] Bus LR 1245; [2012] BCC 
459; [2011] ILPr 34, at paragraph 48 etc.  
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recourse to the courts of State 2 to demonstrate that his claim is 
well founded?” 94 
 
The authors’ answer is: 
 
“[…] in the insolvency proceedings opened in Member State 1, the 
disputed claim would be accepted as a conditional or contingent 
claim [italics in original]. Meanwhile, the creditor may bring his 
case to the courts of Member State 2 and obtain a money 
judgment fixing the amount of his claim [emphasis added]. This 
judgment cannot be directly enforced in State 2 because this state 
must recognize the insolvency proceedings opened in State 1 and 
the effects thereof, in particular the stay of executions by 
individual creditors. However, pursuant to regulation 44/2001 the 
money judgment has, in its turn, to be recognized in State 1, which 
means that this claim must be admitted in the insolvency 
proceedings opened in State 1.”95 
 
29 Elaborating the effects of the lex concursus on proceedings brought by individual 
creditors, the reputable commentary states that the term “proceedings” in Article 
4(2)(f) of the EIR96 is broad enough to encompass all kinds of procedures brought 
about by individual creditors, including enforcement measures. Given that the list 
provided by Article 4(2) of the EIR97 is non-exhaustive, the basic rule remains: 
unless otherwise provided for by the EIR, the lex concursus govern all the effects of 
the insolvency proceedings.98 Then the authors carry on: 
 
“(i) The effects of individual enforcement actions, both pending 
and future, are always determined by the lex fori concursus […] 
 
(ii) The effects on the continuation of lawsuits pending at the 
moment of the opening of the insolvency proceedings are, by way 
of exception, determined by the law of the State where the lawsuit 
is pending (Article 15) 
 
(iii) The effects on commencement, after the opening of 
insolvency proceedings, of new lawsuits are governed by the lex 
fori concursus, with one important exception: international 
jurisdiction [emphasis added]. The lex concursus will determine 
                                                 
94 M. Virgós and F. Garcimartín, above note 17, at 58. 
95 Ibid. 
96 Article 7(2)(f) recast EIR. 
97 Article 7(2) recast EIR. 
98 M. Virgós and F. Garcimartín, above note 17, at 76; The court of first instance in Syska v Vivendi, see 
above note 93, discussed the interpretation of the phrases “proceedings brought by individual creditors” 
and “lawsuit pending” and the related passages of the Report and the commentary of M.Virgós and F. 
Garcimartín at some length. Further, see G. Moss and T. Smith, above note 32, at 342. 
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the necessary procedural modifications which result from the 
divestment of the debtor (e.g. actions will have to be filed by or 
against the liquidator) and may impose a temporary stay 
[emphasis added] to enable the liquidator to make an inventory of 
the debtor’s position. But the international jurisdiction to entertain 
new actions will be determined by the Insolvency Regulation 
itself, in the case of insolvency-derived actions, or by the ordinary 
rules, including the Regulation 44/2001 on civil jurisdiction and 
other international instruments, in other cases.”99 
 
30 Thus, the Virgós-Garcimartín textbook seems to go further than the Report 
acknowledging that Article 4(2)(f) of the EIR100 governs all effects of the insolvency 
proceedings, including all kinds of post-opening procedures brought by individual 
creditors.101 Still, the authors refer to one important exception, namely the 
international jurisdiction. In other words, the lex concursus does not affect the 
international jurisdiction. Even if the lex concursus is based on a strict vis attractiva 
rule, that will not deprive the courts having jurisdiction for the contractual claim 
from the jurisdiction.  
 
31 On the basis of the discussion of the “de facto vis attractiva” thus far, one may 
argue that a lex concursus providing a non-temporary moratorium preventing 
creditors from commencing commercial actions outside the insolvency proceedings 
does create a de facto exclusive jurisdiction in favour of the insolvency forum. 
However, a broad vis attractiva principle was not intended to be adopted by the 
drafters of the EIR.102 While regarding the insolvency-related actions the jurisdiction 
is implied in Article 3(1) of the EIR,103 the non-insolvency related proceedings 
remain within the scope of the BR. By accepting the de facto vis attractiva principle 
(thus the de facto exclusive jurisdiction of the insolvency forum) regarding the non-
insolvency related actions one would necessarily violate the jurisdictional provisions 
of the BR. Although this point is not elaborated in the Virgós-Garcimartín text,104 it 
may be indirectly supported by the phrase used by the authors, namely that the lex 
concursus may impose a temporary stay to enable the liquidator to make an 
inventory of the debtor’s position. It is submitted that this is intended to suggest that 
the impact of the lex concursus on the right of the insolvency court having 
jurisdiction to hear the case is not unlimited; while a temporary stay may be included, 
the impact of the lex concursus should not reach the level of the “de facto vis 
                                                 
99 M. Virgós and F. Garcimartín, above note 17, at 76-77; italics in original. In Kepler, the Court confirmed 
that the words „lawsuits pending”cover only proceedings on the substance; See LBI hf v Kepler Capital 
Markets SA and Frédéric Giraux (Case C-85/12) [2013] ECLI:EU:C:2013:697, at paragraph 54. 
100 Article 7(2)(f) recast EIR. 
101 See Tchenguiz v Grant Thornton UK LLP [2015] EWHC 1864 (Comm); [2015] 2 BCLC 307, at 
paragraph 79: “There is no limitation on the proceedings affected by the winding-up proceedings: it 
applies to any lawsuits [emphasis added] brought by individual creditors (save for lawsuits pending).” 
102 Virgós-Schmit Report, at paragraph 77. 
103 See Article 6 recast EIR. 
104 M. Virgós and F. Garcimartín, above note 17. 
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attractiva” by imposing a final moratorium on new lawsuits in other Member 
States.105  
 
Cases where the Courts have recognised the “de facto vis attractiva” Principle  
 
European Commission v. AMI Semiconductor Belgium BVBA106 
 
32 The Commission and the defendants entered into a contract in 1998 in the 
framework of the Esprit programme. Having taken the view that the services 
provided by the defendants were defective, the Commission terminated the project 
prematurely and sued the defendants, as joint and several debtors, for repayment of 
the advances. The claim was brought in August 2002 after the entry into force of the 
EIR. One of the relevant issues was the admissibility of the claim given that in 
respect of two defendants, an Austrian company and a German company, insolvency 
proceedings had already been opened at the time of the commencement of the 
proceeding (but after the entry into force of the EIR). The jurisdiction of the Court 
was based on the agreement of the parties as enabled by ex Article 238 TEC.107 The 
Court ruled that the Commission's action against the insolvency defendant was 
inadmissible. The relevant part of the judgment is this: 
 
“[The Court have jurisdiction to deal with disputed between the 
parties.] 67. Nevertheless, the question has arisen of how that 
jurisdiction is to be exercised vis-à-vis a party against which 
insolvency proceedings have been instituted. That question must 
be examined in the light of the procedural law applicable in the 
Court of Justice. 
 
68. Given that neither the Statute of the Court of Justice nor its 
Rules of Procedure contain any specific provisions concerning the 
treatment of applications brought against parties against which 
insolvency proceedings have been commenced, it is necessary to 
deduce what rules are applicable from the principles common to 
the procedural laws of the Member States in this area 
[emphasis added]. 
 
69. In that connection, it appears that in the procedural laws of 
most of the Member States a creditor is not entitled to pursue his 
claims before the courts on an individual basis against a person 
who is the subject of insolvency proceedings but is required to 
observe the specific rules of the applicable procedure and that, if 
he fails to observe those rules, his action will be inadmissible. 
                                                 
105 C. Willemer is of a different view. See above note 2, at 329-347. 
106 Commission of the European Communities v AMI Semiconductor Belgium BVBA and Others (Case C-
294/02) [2005] ECR I-2175. 
107 Article 272 TEU. 
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Moreover, the Member States are required, on a mutual basis, to 
respect proceedings commenced in any one of them. That is clear 
from Article 4(2)(f) of Regulation No 1346/2000 [emphasis 
added] according to which the law governing the effects of 
insolvency proceedings brought by individual creditors is that of 
the State in which they were opened, which in this case means 
Austrian law and German law. Furthermore, by virtue of Articles 
16 and 17 of the same regulation, the opening of insolvency 
proceedings in a Member State is to be recognised in all the other 
Member States and is to produce the effects attributed thereto by 
the law of the State in which the proceedings are opened. 
 
70. As the Advocate General observed in points 84 and 85 of her 
Opinion, the aim of Regulation No 1346/2000 is, as is clear in 
particular from recitals 2, 3, 4 and 8 in its preamble, to ensure the 
efficiency and proper coordination of insolvency proceedings 
within the European Union and thus to ensure equal distribution of 
available assets amongst all the creditors. The Community 
institutions would enjoy an unjustifiable advantage over the 
other creditors if they were allowed to pursue their claims in 
proceedings brought before the Community judicature when 
any action before national courts was impossible [emphasis 
added].” 
 
33 It is not completely clear what is the role of “the principles common to the 
procedural laws of the Member States” in the argument, because the judgment itself 
identified the Austrian and German insolvency laws as the relevant lex concursus. 
What is more important from our point of view is that in its judgment the Court 
seemed to recognise the “de facto vis attractiva” effect of the lex concursus via 
Articles 4(2)(f), 16 and 17 of the EIR.108 The Court took into consideration that the 
Commission would have enjoyed an unjustifiable advantage over the other creditors 
if they had been allowed to pursue their claims in proceedings brought before the 
Community judicature when any action before national courts was impossible. This 
piece of the reasoning suggests, however, that what was found inadmissible was only 
bringing a claim for satisfaction before a court outside the state of the opening of the 
insolvency proceedings.  
 
34 Alternatively, the Commission sought a declaratory judgment vis-à-vis those 
defendants who were subject to insolvency proceedings in Germany and Austria 
respectively, in order to prove the debts payable to it for the purpose of pursuing 
them in the national insolvency proceedings.109 Thus, the Court directly faced the 
question whether or not post-insolvency declaratory proceedings (determining the 
                                                 
108 Articles 7(2)(f), 19 and 20 recast EIR. 
109 Commission of the European Communities v AMI Semiconductor Belgium BVBA and Others, above 
note 106, at paragraph 73. 
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validity, legal basis and amount of the claim) may be brought outside the scope of 
the insolvency proceedings opened in another Member State. 
 
35 The Court rejected the alternative claim as inadmissible for procedural reasons 
because the additional alternative claim had been delayed.  Despite this, the Court 
addressed the substantive legal issue as to the question of admissibility of a 
declaratory claim against the insolvent debtors.  
 
“76. Second, the relief sought falls outside the authority conferred 
on the Court of Justice by the arbitration clause in this case, which 
limits its jurisdiction to 'any dispute between the Commission and 
the contractors', and an application seeking a finding which is to 
be relied on in insolvency proceedings implies the involvement 
of other parties, namely the other creditors of the insolvent 
undertaking [emphasis added]. In that connection, it should be 
emphasised that the Commission has not taken any steps with a 
view to involving those parties in the present proceedings. 
 
77. Finally, the considerations set out in paragraphs 68 to 70 of 
this judgment are also applicable to the Commission's 
additional claims [emphasis added], and the latter must be 
declared inadmissible for that reason.” 
 
36 First, the Court referred to the other creditors who should have been involved in 
the commercial proceedings. Unfortunately, the Court did not elaborate on the kind 
of legally protected interests the creditors of the defendant may have had in  
commercial proceedings between the contracting parties (that is, the Commission 
and the insolvent defendants) where the only aim of the proceedings was to rule on 
the existence and amount of the contractual claim against the defendants. It is 
difficult to imagine how the interest of the other creditors, or even the fact that the 
defendants were insolvent, could influence the outcome of a commercial legal 
dispute the subject matter of which were the services of the defendants, asserted by 
the claimant to be defective and which had been performed prior to the opening of 
the insolvency proceedings. Second, the Court indicated that the considerations set 
out regarding the claim for performance (that is, the first cause of action) were also 
applicable to the secondary cause of action seeking a declaratory judgment. Given 
that no further explanation is provided, one may struggle to see any unjustifiable 
advantage enjoyed by the claimant over the other creditors if the claimant were 
allowed to pursue its declaratory claims in proceedings brought before the 
Community judicature having jurisdiction to hear those claims, if the ranking and 
satisfaction of those claims are governed by the lex concursus. 
 
37 In AMI Semiconductor the Court interpreted the (de facto) vis attractiva rule 
extremely widely and found that the declaratory claims against the insolvent debtor 
were also inadmissible. On the other hand, it is questionable whether the Court in 
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this judgment took a general position on the scope of the jurisdiction of the 
insolvency forum and on the vis attractiva concursus as a general principle. Namely, 
the issue at stake was limited to assessing whether the Commission as the institution 
of the EU (as opposed to other creditors) could bring individual actions against a 
debtor that was subject to insolvency proceedings.110 
 
Erste Bank Hungary111 
 
38 The facts of the case in short are these: Main insolvency proceedings over an 
Austrian debtor were opened in Austria. Erste Bank Hungary (Erste), a Hungarian 
entity brought an action before the Municipal Court (Fővárosi Bíróság, Hungary) 
against, among other defendants, the Austrian debtor. Erste sought a declaratory 
judgment vis-à-vis the Austrian defendant to the effect that it had a right over a 
security deposit. The first instance court ruled that since insolvency proceedings 
against the Austrian defendant had already been opened in Austria, Austrian 
insolvency law was the law applicable to the insolvency proceedings and its effects. 
As Austrian law excludes the possibility of bringing an action against an economic 
operator in liquidation in respect of the assets relating to the insolvency, no action 
could be brought against the insolvent Austrian company. Accordingly, the 
Municipal Court delivered an order removing the case from the register. Following 
an appeal by Erste, the Court of Appeal (Fővárosi Ítélőtábla), basing its decision on 
Article 4(1) of the EIR,112 confirmed the order passed at first instance by the 
Municipal Court. It also pointed out that it is Austrian law that determines whether 
Erste may obtain a declaratory judgment that it has a right over the security deposit 
in question.113 
 
39 As can be seen, the position of the courts of the first and second instance was that 
the Austrian insolvency law as lex concursus and applicable through Article 4 of the 
EIR,114 deprived the Hungarian courts, whose jurisdiction stems from the BR, from 
the power to hear the case. As a consequence, the claimant should have asserted its 
claim vis-à-vis the insolvent debtor in the Austrian insolvency proceedings. In other 
words, the Hungarian courts in effect, through the conflict of laws provision of 
Article 4 of the EIR, recognised the priority of the Austrian insolvency proceedings 
                                                 
110 Ibid. at 35-36. 
111 Kúria (Supreme Court of Hungary) Gfv.VII.30.236/2012/5. The decisions referred to in this section 
are the judgments delivered by the first and second instance courts. 
112 Article 7(2)(f) recast EIR. 
113 The claimant then appealed the case to the Legfelsőbb Bíróság (Supreme Court of Hungary, from 1 
January 2012: Kúria). The Supreme Court was of the view that, being the subject matter of the case a 
security deposit situated in Hungary (i.e. outside the state of the opening of the insolvency proceedings), 
Article 5 EIR (Article 8 recast EIR) applies. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the decisions of 
the lower courts. See ERSTE Bank Hungary Nyrt v Hungary (Case C-527/10) [2012] I.L.Pr. 38; A. Csőke, 
A határokon átnyúló fizetésképtelenségi eljárások [Cross-border insolvency proceedings] (2nd ed) (2016, 
HVG-ORAC, Budapest), at 254-257.  
114 Article 7 recast EIR. 
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over the jurisdiction of the Hungarian courts despite the fact that the jurisdiction of 
the Hungarian courts stemmed from the binding and directly applicable BR.115  
 
Lornamead Acquisitions Ltd v. Kaupthing Bank HF116 
 
40 This is a case which is based on the on the Reorganisation and Winding-up of 
Credit Institutions Directive117 (2001 Directive) and the Credit Institutions 
(Reorganisation and Winding-up) Regulations 2004 (SI 2004/1045) by which the 
UK implemented that directive. However, since the regime set up by the Directive 
is comparable with (though not fully identical to) the system set up by the EIR, the 
decision may be of some relevance.  
 
41 An English claimant brought a declaratory claim against an insolvent Icelandic 
bank. The English court had jurisdiction under the Lugano Convention 1988.118 The 
English judge opined119 that if the Icelandic bank against which the English claimant 
had brought a claim in England were indeed subject to an insolvency measure, any 
attempt by the UK court to determine the merits of the claim, would have 
undermined the purpose of the 2001 Directive, namely to give effect throughout the 
EEA to all aspects of the relevant insolvency regime of a credit institution's home 
state, as part of one universal and unitary process, including its moratorium and 
dispute resolution mechanisms. It would also undermine the role of the Icelandic 
court, as the supervisory court of the defendant’s insolvency. Accordingly, the UK 
court should stay the English proceedings, so that the claim could be resolved in the 
liquidation proceedings in accordance with the Icelandic insolvency provisions. 
According to J. Gloster it would be wrong if a claimant under a contract were entitled 
to initiate proceedings in the UK, when it would have no such right in the lex 
concursus. Moreover, a credit institution subject to an EEA insolvency measure 
which was denied full effect in the UK would be exposed to the risk of uncontrolled 
litigation. Unlike an ordinary company, there would be no prospect of obtaining any 
insolvency protection at all, because of the exclusion of the UK insolvency 
proceedings.120 Neither the 2001 Directive, nor the 2004 Regulations, provide any 
sort of carve out, or statutory exception, for claims simply on the grounds that they 
are governed by contractual exclusive jurisdiction clauses. 
 
42 In this case the UK court gave a straightforward and well-reasoned answer to the 
initial question. Pursuant to this court, the purpose of the 2001 Directive is to give 
effect throughout the EEA to all aspects of the relevant insolvency regime of a credit 
                                                 
115 Article 5(1)(a) of the 44/2001 Regulation; Article 7(1)(a) recast BR. 
116 Lornamead Acquisitions Limited v Kaupthing Bank HF [2011] EWHC 2611 (Comm); [2013] 1 BCLC 
73. 
117 Directive 2001/24/EC, OJ 2001 L 125/15 
118 CONVENTION on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters 
Done at Lugano on 16 September 1988 (88/592/EEC) (OJ 1988 L 319/9).  
119 See Lornamead Acquisitions Limited v Kaupthing Bank HF, above note 117, at paragraphs 94-95. 
120 See Article 3 of the Credit Institutions (Reorganisation and Winding-up) Regulations 2004 (SI 
2004/1045). 
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institution's home state, as part of one universal and unitary process, including its 
moratorium and dispute resolution mechanisms. Thus, the lex concursus applies and 
the moratorium prevents the UK court even from deciding on a declaratory claim 
despite the fact that the UK court has jurisdiction arising from the Lugano 
Convention. However, the decision seems to have been influenced by the special 
rules on the reorganisation and winding-up of credit institutions.121 
 
Tchenguiz v Grant Thornton UK LLP122 
 
43 The factual and legal basis of this case was similar to the one of the Lornamead 
decision referred to above. The Icelandic bank sought dismissal or stay of the 
proceedings against it on two independent grounds. The first ground was that the 
claimants were barred from bringing the proceedings against Kaupthing under 
Icelandic law, which had effect in England under the 2004 Regulations. As to this 
issue, the judge referred to Lornamead123 as a main authority124 and concluded that 
the prohibition on proceedings as provided by the Icelandic law was effective in 
England.  
 
44 The Icelandic bank as defendant also contended that the claims against them fell 
within the insolvency exception in Article 1(2)(b) of the (new) Lugano 
Convention125 being identical to the corresponding insolvency exception of the 
BR.126 The UK court, considering the relevant case law of the Court, concluded that 
the connection to the winding up proceeding in Iceland was not sufficiently close to 
qualify the claim as insolvency-related.127 Consequently, the judge found that the 
claims against the Icelandic defendant fell within the Lugano Convention and not 
excluded by Article 1(2)(b) thereof.128 The judge cited AMI Semiconductor with 
approval, emphasising that in that case the questions of choice of law were dealt with 
distinctly from questions of jurisdiction. 
 
“Having decided that it had jurisdiction, the court went on to 
consider choice of law. It decided, by analogy with national 
proceedings, that Article 4(2)(f) of the Insolvency Regulation 
required reference to the rules of the state in which the insolvency 
proceedings were opened. On that basis the mandatory stay arising 
under Austrian and German law was to apply.”129  
 
                                                 
121 Ibid.  
122 Tchenguiz v Grant Thornton UK LLP [2015] EWHC 1864 (Comm); [2015] 2 BCLC 307. 
123 See Lornamead Acquisitions Limited v Kaupthing Bank HF, above note 117. 
124 See Tchenguiz v Grant Thornton UK LLP, above note 123, particularly at paragraphs 52, 66. 
125 Convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial 
matters (OJ 2000 L 339/3). 
126 Article 1(2)(b) recast BR. 
127 Tchenguiz v Grant Thornton UK LLP, above note 123, at paragraph 140-157. 
128 Ibid, at paragraph 158. 
129 See Tchenguiz v Grant Thornton UK LLP, above note 123, at paragraphs 58-59. 
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45 What can be seen in the decisions referred to above is that the courts, despite 
having jurisdiction under the BR (or its counterpart, the Lugano Convention), 
acknowledged the priority of the vis attractiva principle of the state of the opening 
of the insolvency proceeding. By doing so, these decisions in effect established the 
lack of their jurisdiction in defiance of the clear-cut provisions of BR.  
 
Cases where the Courts rejected the “de facto vis attractiva” Principle 
 
Gibraltar Residential Properties Ltd v Gibralcon130 
 
46 The claimant, GRPL, a company registered in Gibraltar, had engaged Gibralcon, 
a company registered in Spain, to construct part of a substantial property 
development scheme in Gibraltar. The contract was subject to the laws of Gibraltar 
and the parties submitted to the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of England and 
Wales. Main insolvency proceedings opened over the Spanish contractor in Spain. 
Subsequently, GRPL issued proceedings in the United Kingdom, making a number 
of claims under the contract. GRPL submitted that the UK had exclusive jurisdiction 
to hear the claims on the basis of the jurisdiction clause contained in the contract. 
Gibralcon, on the other hand, sought declarations that the English courts had no 
jurisdiction because of the insolvency proceedings opened in Spain. It argued that 
the insolvency exception in the BR applied and that the amounts due under the 
contract were to be determined by the Spanish administrators. Gibralcon also 
asserted that the vis attractiva principle followed by the Spanish Insolvency Act 
applied also in international context and not only for domestic proceedings.131   
 
47 Prior to the hearing, the Commercial Court in Madrid made an order declaring 
that the UK court “does not have jurisdiction [emphasis added] to adopt any kind of 
measures, either precautionary or executive, relating to the assets or rights 
comprising the company equity of [Gibralcon]”. In addition, the Spanish court 
requested the English court to abstain from hearing the case.132  
 
48 In the English court, the judge first made it clear that the English court would do 
no more than to pass a declaratory judgment regarding the claim of GRPL and would 
not interfere anyhow in the Spanish insolvency proceedings: 
 
“13 I should say at once, so that there is no misunderstanding about 
it, that because Gibralcon is now the subject of insolvency 
proceedings […] this court would not make orders directing 
Gibralcon to pay money to GRPL if the court found that […] 
money was owed by Gibralcon to GRPL. Instead, the court would 
make declarations in relation to the matters set out above […] so 
                                                 
130 Gibraltar Residential Properties Ltd v Gibralcon [2010] EWHC 2595 (TCC); [2011] BLR 126; [2011] 
ILPr 27. 
131 Ibid, at paragraphs 38-49. 
132 Ibid, at paragraph 7. 
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that GRPL could prove that debt in the Spanish insolvency 
proceedings. 
14 So I must make it entirely clear that this court, having made 
declarations as asked, would then leave the question of GRPL’s 
entitlement to payment to be dealt with in the insolvency 
proceedings in Spain. In the alternative, if it was found that a net 
sum was due to Gibralcon, the court would make directions for 
payment of that sum to the administrators in Spain or, at least, 
order a stay of such payment in order to give the administrators an 
opportunity to intervene and seek an appropriate order from this 
court. 
 
15 Accordingly, there is no question whatever that this court would 
take any step to prejudice or interfere with the Spanish insolvency 
proceedings. This court will do no more than determine the 
rights of the parties under this contract, disputes which are 
subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of England 
and Wales, and make declarations accordingly, and, in 
particular, determine so far as it can which party is owed 
money by the other and how much [emphasis added]. 
 
52 […] [T]his court would not seek to enforce its decisions given 
the existence of the insolvency proceedings in Spain. So if GRPL 
receives decisions that are in its favour from this court, it must 
lodge its claim in the Spanish insolvency proceedings. There 
will be no question of enforcement in this jurisdiction 
[emphasis added].” 
 
49 Second, the judge distinguished between the scope of the BR and the EIR 
regarding jurisdiction. He stated, referring to German Graphics as principal 
authority,133 that  
 
“28 [i]t is now established that the fact that a defendant in 
commercial proceedings is the subject of insolvency proceedings 
in another Member State is not of itself a ground for depriving the 
Jurisdiction and Judgments Regulation of application: see the 
decision of the European Court of Justice in German Graphics 
Graphische Maschinen GmbH v Van der Schee [2010] I.L.Pr. 1, 
which followed the earlier decisions of the ECJ in Gourdain v 
Nadler [1979] ECR 733, and Seagon v Deko Marty Belgium NV 
[2009] 1 WLR 2168.” 
 
                                                 
133 See G. McCormack, above note 17, at 330. 
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“37 I consider that the Insolvency Regulation 1346/2000 [EIR] and 
the Jurisdiction and Judgments Regulation 44/2001 [BR] are 
intended to provide mutually exclusive codes in relation to 
jurisdiction: the former is confined to insolvency and analogous 
proceedings, whereas the latter applies to other civil and 
commercial proceedings […].” 
 
50 Third, the interplay between Article 4 of the EIR134 and the question of 
jurisdiction was addressed. Gibralcon’s main argument was based on Article 4(2)(f) 
of the EIR135 stating that Spanish law as lex concursus determined the effects of 
insolvency proceedings on proceedings brought by individual creditors.  
 
“34 […] Article 4 is headed »Law applicable«. So this article, as 
both this heading and its text indicates, is concerned with 
applicable law, not with questions of jurisdiction. This is for the 
simple reason that art. 3 of the Regulation deals with jurisdiction 
and provides for international jurisdiction to open insolvency 
proceedings.” 
 
51 Thus, the English court clearly rejected the argument that the lex concursus, 
through Article 4 of the EIR,136 can even indirectly, affect the jurisdiction of the 
court whose jurisdiction is rooted in the BR. By contrast, the English court (having 
jurisdiction) held that it was entitled to hear the case on its merits and to pass a 
declaratory judgment on the rights and obligation of the parties. 
 
52 Finally, the judge, considering the legal position elaborated above went on 
(perhaps unnecessarily) to examine the vis attractiva concursus according to Spanish 
law. Apparently, Spanish insolvency law followed the vis attractiva principle in 
providing that the jurisdiction of the Insolvency Court was exclusive and excluded 
all others in both civil actions with an economic impact lodged against the insolvent 
debtor’s estate.137 It is not an ambition of this paper to analyse the Spanish vis 
attractiva rule. However, the opinion of Professor Virgós, who acted as GRPL’s 
expert witness in the English proceedings, is remarkable and concerns not only the 
Spanish law. He was asked to interpret Article 11 of the Spanish Insolvency Act 
which limited the scope of the Spanish vis attractiva rule in the international arena. 
He opined that the vis attractiva rule as provided by the Spanish law was limited to 
the domestic field.  
 
“42 […] He [Prof. Virgós] says that it is only for domestic 
litigation that the vis attractiva concursus applies: otherwise, the 
Spanish judge would have to be transformed into what he 
                                                 
134 Article 7 recast EIR. 
135 Article 7(2)(f) recast EIR. 
136 Article 7 recast EIR. 
137 Gibraltar Residential Properties Ltd v Gibralcon, above note 131, at paragraph 38. 
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called a sort of »Judge Hercules« capable of dealing with 
whatever action under whatever law [emphasis added]. He says 
that to permit this would result in conflicts of jurisdiction with 
foreign courts [emphasis added].” 
 
53 This points to another aspect of the question. However broadly a vis attractiva 
principle is interpreted, it must be noted that the commercial proceedings vis-à-vis 
the debtor are basically governed by the law as determined by the Rome regime, that 
is, typically by the law chosen by the parties (excluding the insolvency effects)138. 
In other words, even if the vis attractiva principle were very broad and all of the 
post-commencement claims brought against the debtor were forced to the insolvency 
forum, this would not change the law applicable for the litigation. Thus, the 
insolvency forum would need to decide the case on the basis of the general (i.e. non-
insolvency) law which governs the contract: questions like warranty claims, 
defective performance, compensation, or pre-insolvency interest rates would be 
decided by the law chosen by the parties. The court of the state where the insolvency 
proceedings are opened may face real difficulties in solving complex legal issues 
subject to a foreign law. Consequently, the life of the insolvency judges of the 
opening state may be easier if a foreign court having jurisdiction pursuant to the 
general (that is, non-insolvency) rules does the job and delivers a declaratory 
judgment determining the existence and the amount of the claimant’s claim139 
leaving it to the claimant to try to enforce his claim in the framework of the 
insolvency proceedings. 
 
54 To sum up, the judge in Gibralcon ruled that on the basis that the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the UK court had been conferred by the BR, this court was entitled to 
decide the case. However, this ruling was declaratory in its nature, in the sense that 
the prevailing party would need to lodge its claim with the Spanish liquidator and 
that Spanish insolvency law would apply regarding the enforcement. Despite of all 
the elegance, simplicity and practicality of the solution chosen by the English judge, 
however, it was not fully compliant with the wording of the EIR.  
The EIR provides that the effects of the insolvency (moratorium included) are to be 
determined by the lex concursus. But how could a universal vis attractiva rule be 
reconciled with the exclusive jurisdiction of the foreign courts? This is contradiction 
between the regimes set up by the EIR and the BR which cannot be solved without 
apparently violating the provisions of the one or the other instrument.140   
                                                 
138 See above, at paragraph 15. 
139 This argument appears also in other decisions. See Fondazione Enasarco v Lehman Brothers Finance 
SA, above note 24, at paragraphs 57-58; UBS AG v Omni Holding AG (in Liquidation), above note 7.  
140 By contrast, the authors of the Heidelberg-Vienna Report are of the view that if the lex concursus bars 
individual creditors from enforcing their claim against the debtor outside the insolvency proceedings, this 
dictum claims validity in all other Member States by virtue of universality. In this regard, Article 4(2) 
EIR has jurisdictional effect. The authors of the Report opine that this aspect was overlooked in 
Gibralcon. See B. Hess, P. Oberhammer and T. Pfeiffer, External Evaluation of Regulation No. 
1346/2000/EC on Insolvency Proceedings (Heidelberg-Luxembourg-Vienna Report) 
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Conclusion 
 
55 The main points of this paper can be summarised as follows: 
a) The EIR and the BR are intended to be mutually exclusive. Proceedings 
which do not fall within the EIR will generally fall within the scope of the 
BR.  
b) The EIR follows a limited vis attractiva rule: only the insolvency-related 
actions as determined by the Gourdain test are attracted by the main 
insolvency proceeding opened in another Member State.  
c) By contrast, jurisdiction over the other actions, for example, claims based 
on the general law against the insolvent defendant, are determined by the 
BR.   
d) A non-temporary moratorium provided by the lex concursus and given 
effect in other Member States by Article 4(2)(f) of the EIR141 prohibiting 
any other courts but the insolvency forum to hear the actions against the 
insolvent defendant amounts, in effect, to a de facto vis attractiva rule. In 
other words, such a moratorium, in effect, confers de facto exclusive 
jurisdiction on the insolvency forum because any other forum is supposed 
to be deprived of the power to hear the case. This de facto vis attractiva rule 
is in conflict with the rules on jurisdiction as determined directly by the BR. 
e) Thus, should a court recognise the de facto vis attractiva principle and 
abstain from hearing the case, this is not in compliance with the 
jurisdictional rules as determined by the binding and directly applicable 
BR. 
f) By contrast, should a court insist on exercising its jurisdiction and hear the 
case, by doing so the court would violate Article 4 of the EIR,142 at least the 
literal meaning thereof, which attributes a universal effect to the 
moratorium provided for by the lex concursus.   
56 However,  the territory of the conflict is rather narrow: it is limited to the 
declaratory aspects of actions brought against the debtor after the opening of the 
insolvency proceedings. Actions brought prior to the opening of the insolvency 
proceeding (pending lawsuits) fall within the exception provided by Article of the 
15 EIR143 thus Article 4 of the EIR144 does not apply here. Actions for performance 
clearly fall within the scope of the lex concursus; in those cases the lex concursus 
will determine how such claims can be enforced vis-à-vis the debtor in or outside the 
framework of the insolvency proceedings.  
                                                 
<http://ec.europa.eu/justice/civil/files/evaluation_insolvency_en.pdf>, at 194-195. A. Csőke is also of the 
view that Gibralcon was wrongly decided, above note 114, at 233-236. 
141 Article 7(2)(f) recast EIR. 
142 Article 7 recast EIR. 
143 Article 18 recast EIR. 
144 Article 7 recast EIR. 
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57 It could be said that the conflict is an ostensible one because it originates merely 
from the wording of Article 4(2)(f) of the EIR.145 However, the fact that the case law 
is divergent shows that it is about a real issue. Apparently, the conflicting provisions 
give rise to legal uncertainty. Since the recast EIR has not brought any changes in 
this field146 it is to be assumed that the Court will have the last say in this question. 
 
58 It is submitted that the approach applied by the English court in Gibralcon is more 
justifiable:  
 
 The BR, rather than the applicable law determines the jurisdiction. 
 The legitimate expectation of the parties is protected as far as possible: the 
existence and amount of the claim is established by the court the jurisdiction 
of which they agreed on or at least were able to foresee. 
 The collective interests of the body of the stakeholders in the insolvency 
proceedings must also be taken into consideration; no foreign judgment will 
be enforced vis-à-vis the insolvent debtor unless the applicable insolvency 
law (lex concursus) allows. 
 The commercial litigation will be heard and decided by a court most probably 
the best suited to deal with it; the one chosen by the parties or otherwise 
determined by the BR. This may be of great assistance to the insolvency 
forum as it is not required to decide commercial cases likely to be governed 
by a foreign law and potentially based on foreign language documents. 
 
 
                                                 
145 Article 7(2)(f) recast EIR. 
146 See B. Hess, P. Oberhammer and T. Pfeiffer, above note 141, at 253-254. 
